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Keeton: Roger Traynor as a Judge

ROGER TRAYNOR AS A JUDGE
Page Keeton*
When one turns to thoughts about judicial law-making during the past fifteen years, he might well at the outset give attention to the area of torts for some outstanding examples. If he does
so, he will discover that much of tort law has been rewritten to
meet the needs of the vast changes that have been produced in
social conditions brought about by a variety of factors, including
technology, urbanization, and an increasing population. Roger
Traynor, as an Associate Justice and then as Chief Justice of the
California Supreme Court, has been one of those in the vanguard
of this movement. Many judges are content to apply old rules in
a mechanical and repetitious manner, even to entirely new situations, and to espouse the notion of judicial abstention in favor of
the legislature, even when change is deemed to be for the public
interest. A few judges, without the same reverence for stare decisis, are not so hesitant about making new law to meet new
conditions. Roger Traynor is an outstanding example of such a
judge. He has not been averse to bringing about wholesale and
abrupt change in the basic law by judicial decisions when feasible. Nor has he been reluctant to alter some or make exceptions
to a general doctrine in a given area when abrupt changes would
produce too much uncertainty or too much confusion unless accomplished through the legislative process, which is more suitable for constructing the details of an entirely new approach.
It has been my privilege to review in another connection
Roger Traynor's impact on the law of torts, both in clarifying
existing law by way of illuminating the factors involved as well
as in bringing about abrupt and radical change.' It is enough to
say here that his espousal of the notion that neither fault nor
privity of contract should be required as a prerequisite to recovery
for those who are victimized by defective and dangerous products
was a great impetus to the development of strict liability of manufacturers and other sellers of defective and dangerous products.2
And, his dissenting opinion in Knight v. Kaiser Co.,' involving
* Dean, The University of Texas School of Law.
1. P. Keeton, Roger Traynor and the Law of Torts, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 1045 (1971).
2. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P. 2d 436, 440 (1944).
The reasons set forth in his concurring opinion in this case preceded by sixteen years the
landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
3. 48 Cal. 2d 778, 785, 312 P. 2d 1089, 1093 (1957). His dissenting opinion here
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the intricacies of tort law related to the occupier of land, probably
presages the ultimate abrogation of the complex set of rules pertaining to the duty of an occupier of land to invitees, licensees,
adults and infant trespassers.
I would conclude this brief salute to Roger Traynor's genius
as a judge with his own words:4
Judicial lawmaking requires not only the usual rigorous objectivity, but the fortitude to abandon formula and construct
anew. . . . Time and again . . . judges must marshal their
resources for the relentless, lonely task ahead as they review the
record of the case and become aware that no magic words could
do it justice.
presaged the later California Supreme Court decision overruling prior California decisions
distinguishing between the duty of an occupier of land to trespassers, licensees and invitees. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P. 2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
4. Traynor, No Magic Words Can Do Justice, 49 CAL. L. REv. 615 (1961).
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